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KNOWLEDGE REGIMES AND COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 Comparative political economy has been dominated since the 1970s by two waves 
of research.  The first one examined how different types of policy-making regimes affect policy 
making and, in turn, national economic competitiveness (e.g., Katzenstein 1978).  The second 
one studied how different types of production regimes affect national competitiveness (e.g., Hall 
and Soskice 2001).  Absent from all of this is much discussion about knowledge regimes.  
Knowledge regimes are sets of actors, organizations, and institutions that produce and 
disseminate policy ideas that affect how policy-making and production regimes are organized 
and operate in the first place.  Knowledge regimes are important because they contribute data, 
research, theories, policy recommendations, and other ideas that influence public policy and, 
thus, national economic competitiveness (Baab 2001; Campbell 1998; Pedersen 2006). 
 
 It is surprising that such a blind spot exists.  Since the early 1990s a rich literature 
has emerged on how ideas, broadly construed, affect policymaking (Campbell 2002).  Some 
proponents of the production regime and policy-making regime approaches have contributed to 
this literature (e.g., Hall 1993; Katzenstein 1996).  It is ironic, then, that they have not more 
systematically connected their work on ideas with their work on policy-making and production 
regimes.  This paper does so by showing how knowledge regimes vary across different types of 
political economies. 
  
 We proceed, first, by reviewing the research on ideas and knowledge regimes in 
order to make the point that virtually no one has tried to situate an analysis of knowledge 
regimes within an analysis of policy-making and production regimes.  Second, we compare the 
most important factors distinguishing between basic types of policy-making and production 
regimes.  We do so in order to construct a fourfold typology of political economies.  Third, for 
each of these political economic types we examine representative countries to see how their 
knowledge regimes are organized.  The principle countries in question are the United States, 
Britain, Germany, and France, although we briefly discuss a few others as well.  Fourth, we 
summarize this empirical discussion by hypothesizing the ideal-typical knowledge regimes that 
are likely associated with our four types of political economies. 
 
 We argue that liberal market economies with decentralized, open states (the United 
States) tend to have market-oriented knowledge regimes that are highly competitive and often 
partisan and adversarial.  Liberal market economies with centralized, closed states (Britain) also 
tend to have competitive knowledge regimes, but the level of partisan competition is tempered 
politically by public funding for knowledge producers in civil society and by the state’s own in-
house analytic capacities.  Coordinated market economies with decentralized, open states 
(Germany) tend to have relatively more consensus-oriented knowledge regimes as a result of 
having political economies with strong associational and corporatist institutional arrangements, 
parliamentary systems that often produce coalition governments, and much public funding for 
knowledge producers.  Finally, coordinated market economies with centralized, closed states 
(France) tend to have statist-technocratic knowledge regimes where much policy-relevant 
knowledge is produced in-house by the state.  Of course, competition and conflict over ideas 
exist within all types of knowledge regimes.  Our point is that the manner in which this is 
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handled, and whether it produces winners and losers or compromise and consensus, depends on 
the institutional configuration of the political economy in question. 
 
 This paper breaks new ground.  To our knowledge, it is the first one to combine 
insights from the diverse literatures on production regimes, policy-making regimes, and ideas to 
better understand how policy-relevant knowledge is created.  In particular, we are not aware of 
any other studies that analyze how production and policy-making regimes together affect the 
organization and functioning of knowledge regimes.  This is our central concern. 
 
 Three caveats are in order.  First, our argument is preliminary, based only on 
secondary literatures, and, therefore, requires elaboration through future research.  Second, we 
focus on how different political economic institutions affect how knowledge regimes are 
organized and operate.  That is, we focus on the knowledge production process.  We are not 
concerned in this paper with either the content of that knowledge per se or the impact that it may 
have on policy makers, or with how these ideas may cause changes in political economic 
institutions.  Although obviously important, these are issues that cannot be addressed adequately 
without detailed historical case studies, which are well beyond the scope of this paper.  Third, 
while we accept that ideas often matter, we are not assuming that once an idea is created it 
always has an impact on policy making.  We recognize that ideas get selected, modified, or 
ignored depending on constellations of power. 
 
Research On Ideas and Knowledge Regimes 
 
 Three literatures point to the importance of knowledge regimes.  First is an 
extensive literature on how ideas affect the policy-making process (Campbell 2002).  It focuses 
on how different types of ideas, such as policy programs, intellectual paradigms, public 
sentiments, and frames affect the policy-making process.  However, much of this work focuses 
on how the structure of different types of ideas constrains policy making.  Missing is much 
discussion of the actors, organizations, and institutions that affect the creation, framing, and 
transmission of these ideas.  That is, the literature privileges ideational structure over agency 
and, thus, does not clearly specify some of the most important actors and mechanisms whereby 
knowledge affects states and economies (Campbell 2004, chap. 4; Yee 1996).  Furthermore, with 
only rare exceptions (e.g., Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002), few researchers have examined 
how the operation and impact of the knowledge regimes that produce these ideas in the first 
place vary cross-nationally. 
 
 A second much smaller group of studies takes agency more seriously and 
investigates how knowledge regimes are organized, how they create policy ideas, what the 
mechanisms are by which these ideas are disseminated to policy makers, and how all of this 
varies among countries.  Some studies focus on only knowledge regimes in a single country 
(e.g., Hall 1993).  Some studies examine how different policy ideas were used politically to 
shape policy making, but pay relatively little attention to how the organization and operation of 
the knowledge regimes that produced these ideas were determined by surrounding political-
economic institutions (e.g., Blyth 2002).  Some studies show how policy ideas diffused across 
countries and the conditions under which these ideas took root or not.  But, again, they ignore 
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how these ideas were produced in the first place by different types of knowledge regimes (e.g., 
Hall 1989).  Finally, some studies analyze how knowledge regimes were organized and operated 
in different countries.  But these efforts either explore countries belonging to the same type of 
production regime, thus limiting the possibilities for drawing comparisons across production 
regimes (e.g., Furner and Supple 1990; Nielsen and Pedersen 1991), or they focus on knowledge 
regimes during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an era during which states, 
economies, and presumably knowledge regimes were much different than they are today (e.g., 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996).   
 
 Finally, a third literature focuses on think tanks, often defined as non-profit 
organizations, formally independent from government, and engaged in the analysis of public 
policy issues.  Think tanks attempt to influence policy in many ways, such as by providing expert 
analysis or lobbying.  They often display a high level of scientific expertise (Stone 1996a).  This 
literature tends to be highly descriptive.  Much of it is based on analyses of only single countries, 
often the United States or Britain.  And, most important, while some of it seeks to explain cross-
national variation in the think tank environment by referring to the institutional features of 
policy-making regimes, it virtually ignores how the character of production regimes affects 
knowledge regimes (e.g., McGann and Weaver 2000; Stone et al. 1998). 
 
 Overall, then, all three of these literatures point toward, but in most cases do not 
systematically develop, an analysis of knowledge regimes along the lines we have proposed.  
Nonetheless, we will draw on this work where appropriate to develop our arguments. 
 
Production and Policy-Making Regimes 
 
 The first step in our analysis is to differentiate among important types of 
production and policy-making regimes.  Our purpose in reviewing these well-known differences 
is to enable us to identify in the next section of the paper four ideal types of political economies 
and then to discuss what we believe are representative examples of knowledge regimes 
associated with each one. 
 
 Comparative political economists often distinguish between two types of 
production regimes (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001).  Liberal market economies, such as the United 
States and Britain, structure economic activity primarily through markets and corporate 
hierarchies where corporate managers respond primarily to price signals and make strategic 
decisions without much consultation with other organizations in their environment.  Coordinated 
market economies, such as Germany and France, structure economic activity more through non-
market relationships, such as informal networks, formal corporatist bargaining, associations, and 
various forms of state intervention and regulation.  In some cases, corporate managers consult 
regularly with other stakeholders–that is, those with a vested interest in the corporation, such as 
employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders–and tend to coordinate their decision making 
with them.  In other cases, the state ensures that coordination occurs. Hence, the process of 
economic coordination and decision making in liberal market economies is driven by market-
based competition whereas in coordinated market economies it is also driven by institutionally-
based cooperation of various sorts.  In other words, decision making in coordinated market 
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economies tends to be multilateral and often more consensus oriented than it is in liberal market 
economies where it tends to be unilateral, typically dominated by corporate managers, and less 
consensus oriented. 
 
 The distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies has been 
criticized for ignoring important differences among countries, especially within the coordinated 
category (Amable 2003; Crouch 2005).  For instance, France relies heavily on the state as a 
means of non-market coordination whereas Germany relies heavily on corporatist bargaining.  
Even proponents of the liberal-coordinated dichotomy have acknowledged recently the 
significance of these differences (e.g., Hall and Gingerich 2004). 
 
 Regarding policy-making regimes, researchers often distinguish between two 
institutional types of states (e.g., Katzenstein 1978).  In centralized and closed states policy 
making is located in a few policy-making arenas that tend to be insulated from the external 
influences of civil society.  Policy-making authority is vested primarily in the national 
government.  And the electoral victor often controls both the executive and legislative branches 
of the government.  Moreover, these states often have an extensive, well-developed, permanent, 
and professional civil service extending far up the bureaucracy.  As a result, few bureaucratic 
layers are subject to removal after elections.  In decentralized and open states policy making is 
much less insulated from external influences, policy-making authority is often shared or 
delegated to lower levels of government, as is typical in federalist systems, and the permanent 
civil service is much less extensive. 
 
Political Economies and Knowledge Regimes 
 
 How do different types of political economies affect knowledge regimes?  In this 
section we identify four types of political economies based on the distinctions reviewed in the 
previous section.   For each type we will examine how the knowledge regimes of certain 
countries are organized and operate.  We argue that the institutional configuration of a country’s 
knowledge regime reflects and is largely determined by its surrounding political-economic 
institutions. 
 
 There are several types of knowledge producing organizations in most knowledge 
regimes.  We focus on four that have received the most attention in the think tank literature.  
First are academic-style scholarly research units, sometimes referred to as universities without 
students.  These are staffed with scholars, professional researchers, and analysts, often with joint 
university appointments.  They are often dependent on public funding.  They produce expert 
research monographs and journal articles much like those found in academia.  They also tend to 
be politically and ideologically non-partisan.  Second are advocacy research units.  They tend to 
be privately funded and are politically and ideologically partisan.  They are less concerned with 
conducting scholarly research than with packaging and disseminating the research of others in 
brief policy papers and through the media in order to influence the ideological climate, public 
debate, and public policy.  Third are party research units.  These are closely associated with 
political parties and provide a source of expert advice and analysis for party members.  
Sometimes they are actually housed within the party apparatus itself.  Fourth are state research 
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units either directly affiliated with specific government departments and ministries or created on 
an ad hoc basis to advise government on a specific matter.  Unlike the first three, these are 
largely apart from civil society.1 
 
Liberal Market Economy/Decentralized, Open State 
 
 The United States is typically characterized as a liberal market economy with a 
decentralized, open state.  Business associations are not nearly as important in organizing the 
interests of business in the United States as they are in most European countries.  Labor unions 
are also very weak by comparison.  Corporatism is virtually unheard of.  And cartels and 
Japanese or German style business networks are largely absent. 
 
 Insofar as the political landscape is concerned, when compared to most other 
advanced capitalist democracies the two major political parties are rather weak and poorly 
disciplined because elections are based on winner-take-all rules and candidates are funded 
primarily through private contributions.  Furthermore, political power is decentralized as a result 
of constitutional federalism, there is a clear separation of powers between legislative and 
executive branches of government, and these branches are frequently controlled by different 
parties.  There are dozens of congressional committees affording outsiders access to the policy-
making process.  Finally, the permanent civil service is not nearly as well developed or extensive 
as it is in many other countries.  When a new government is elected, many high-level personnel 
in cabinet bureaucracies and administrative agencies are replaced with new political appointees 
in what amounts to a political spoils system. 
 
 The U.S. knowledge regime reflects these political-economic institutions.  There 
are well over 1,000 research units in the United States today and over 100 inside Washington 
D.C. alone (Gellner 1995).  There is a long history of scholarly research units.  The first were 
established in the early twentieth century and received most of their financial support from 
philanthropic organizations and occasionally corporations.  Examples include the Russell Sage 
Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and later the Brookings Institution.  Because their finances 
were secured by generous endowments they did not have to cater to the partisan pressures of 
donors.  Their goal was to improve and rationalize the political decision-making process–not 
influence the political agenda.  After the Second World War, a second generation of scholarly 
research units like the RAND Corporation as well as university-based research institutes were set 
up as a result of the federal government’s desire to contract out for policy research (Abelson 
2004).  All of this was consistent with the principles of liberal market economies, which favor 
private sector activity whenever possible. 
 
 Beginning in the 1970s, a generation of advocacy research units developed.  These 
included the conservative Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, and  Manhattan Institute, and a 
                                                 
1Some people have referred to these types of organizations as think tanks.  Because there is much 
debate–and even confusion–about exactly what a think tank is (e.g., Stone 2004; Rich 2004), we 
avoid this language entirely. 
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few liberal organizations, such as the Institute for Policy Studies.  They often resembled interest 
groups insofar as they pressured decision makers to implement policies compatible with their 
ideological beliefs and those shared by their generous benefactors (Abelson 1998; Rich in this 
volume). 
 
 There are no party research units per se.  But there are some state research units, 
such as the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the Office of Management and Budget.  There is 
also the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, which appoints experts, often from 
universities, to conduct various policy analytic activities.  Many congressional committees also 
have research staffs.  And most cabinet-level departments have assistant secretaries directing 
professional research and evaluation units.  The capacity for research that some of these 
organizations have is greater than most research units in civil society and has grown over the 
years.  Notably, the CBO and CRS have staffs of about 200 and 900 people, respectively.  Given 
the constitutionally mandated separation of powers in the United States, and the fragmented 
nature of the legislative and executive branches, it is not surprising that there are so many 
research units inside the state.  However, this facilitates much competition between branches and 
agencies and, therefore, their research units.  Again, this has created opportunities for state 
research units to supply data, analysis, technical advice, and political argument to players in 
these political contests.  Some observers have argued that the proliferation of state research units 
has diminished the relative influence of other types of research units in the policy-making 
process (Smith 1989).  Nevertheless, compared to most European countries, the U.S. knowledge 
regime is dominated much more by scholarly and advocacy research units than by party and state 
research units (Abelson 1992; Gellner 1995).  
 
 Political-economic institutions led to the development of this sort of knowledge 
regime in several ways.  First, the phenomenal growth of scholarly and advocacy research units 
has much to do with the fact that tax law makes it easy to establish a tax-exempt, non-profit 
organization.  Corporate financing is also readily available.  So private resources are available to 
finance research units to a much greater extent than in many other countries.  This is consistent 
with a liberal market economy insofar as much support is given to corporate initiative and 
private sector volunteerism. 
 
 Second, the decentralized, open nature of the state afforded scholarly and advocacy 
research units plenty of opportunities to reach policy makers and their staffs if they wanted to do 
so.  For instance, the proliferation of new government programs and bureaucracies and the 
related demands of the civil rights and anti-war movements catalyzed the emergence of liberal 
scholarly research units during the 1960s.  In turn, this led to a counter mobilization by 
conservatives who then formed or expanded the capacities of their own scholarly and advocacy 
research units, often with corporate financing (Abelson 1992; Fischer 1991; Ricci 1993). 
 
 Third, comparatively speaking, the government is dominated by temporary political 
appointees rather than professional career bureaucrats.  This also encourages dependency on 
outsiders for intelligence, analysis, and policy advice (Abelson 1998; Coleman 1991; Gellner 
1995; James 1993).  Indeed, the initial growth of research units in civil society after the Second 
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World War was driven in part by a demand among policy makers for policy expertise, 
particularly in foreign policy. 
 
 Finally, political parties are weak and have not established significant in-house 
policy research capacities of their own.  Moreover, given the undisciplined nature of political 
parties, American politicians are less likely to toe the party line than politicians in other 
countries.  Hence, they are more inclined to seek policy advice and expertise from scholarly and 
advocacy research units (Abelson 2004, 2000, 1998). 
 
 It follows that the United States is much more a competitive market place for ideas 
than most other countries.  Indeed, advocacy research units, but to an increasing extent also the 
more scholarly research units, engage strategically in that competition by trying to attract the 
attention of the media and influence public opinion in ways that are comparatively unique 
(Abelson 1992, 2004; Feulner 2000).  Today, the partisan competitive marketing of ideas has 
gained ground while scholarly detachment has lost ground (Gellner 1995).  In terms of its large 
number of scholarly and advocacy research units, the generous funding and staffing that they 
often enjoy, the increasingly partisan nature of their activities, and the intensely competitive 
nature of policy-relevant knowledge production and dissemination, the U.S. knowledge regime is 
rather exceptional compared to those in other countries. 
 
Liberal Market Economy/Centralized, Closed State 
 
 Britain is a liberal market economy with a centralized, closed state.  Despite 
fleeting experiments with corporatism during the 1960s and 1970s, British business associations 
are not especially central to the coordination of economic activity and state regulation is fairly 
limited.  There has been some state-ownership in a few infrastructure sectors, but considerably 
less so since privatization during the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government.  
Labor is better organized than in the United States, but not nearly as well organized as in most 
continental European countries.  So, markets and corporate hierarchies are the key mechanisms 
of economic governance. 
 
 Regarding the state, there are two major political parties competing for power in a 
winner-take-all electoral system, as there are in the United States.  But in Britain, the parties are 
well-disciplined so members of parliament generally toe the party line.  And as is true in most 
parliamentary systems, the party in power typically controls both the legislature and executive 
branches.  Hence, the government can more or less do what it wants without significant 
opposition.  Moreover, Britain has a highly professional, extensive, and permanent civil service 
which remains despite changes in the ruling party.  Finally, in contrast to U.S. federalism, state 
power is centralized at the national level.  Policy-making authority is vested in the Prime 
Minister’s office, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy; it is not diffused into parliamentary 
committees; and there are fewer points of access to policy makers. 
 
 Britain has a much smaller field of research units than the United States.  There are 
some scholarly research units.  These were first set up during the inter-war period, but more were 
founded immediately after the Second World War.  They emerged in response to political 
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necessities and the inadequacies of contemporary research facilities.  Many are publicly funded.  
Notably, the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research were established for these purposes and produce a variety of scholarly 
documents and reports on a wide range of policy-relevant topics (Day 2000; Denham and 
Garnett 1998; James 1993). 
 
 A few advocacy research units have also been around for a long time.  The Fabian 
Society, for example, was established in 1884 and eventually became loosely affiliated with the 
Labor Party (Day 2000; Denham and Garnett 2004).  And the Mont Pelerin Society was 
established in the 1940s to advance conservative, free market ideas (Desai 1994).  That said, 
beginning in the 1970s, and in response to the perceived failures of Keynesian policies, more 
advocacy research units emerged with strong conservative orientations, such as the Center for 
Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute, which was established in 1974 by Sir Keith Joseph 
and Margaret Thatcher (Denham and Garnett 1998, 2004; Stone 1996b).  Moreover, financial 
institutions in London began to develop in-house research and analytic capacities that were 
important in developing and disseminating monetarist and other neoliberal ideas (Hall 1993).  In 
the late 1980s and 1990s leading figures from academia, business, and the unions set up 
alternatives, such as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Demos, to reverse the 
intellectual dominance of the right (Denham and Garnett 1999; Stone 1996b). 
 
 All of these advocacy research units had close ties to either the Conservative or 
Labor parties, although they were not established by the parties per se and, therefore, should not 
be considered party research units.  However partisan they may be, the major conservative 
advocacy research units make serious, thoughtful, well-researched contributions, although they 
also sometimes recycle ideas from elsewhere and use the media to their advantage strategically 
(Desai 1994; Gaffney 1991).  The same is true for IPPR.  In any case, advocacy research units 
now represent a considerably larger proportion of all civil society research units in Britain than 
in the coordinated market economies of Europe (Day 2000, pp. 128-29).  But compared to the 
United States, British advocacy research units are relatively rare, have smaller staffs, and have 
less funding (Denham and Garrnet 1998, 1996; James 1993).  Over all, there is a dearth of 
research units in British civil society. 
 
 Britain has a considerable number of state research units.  For instance, in 1970 
Edward Heath established the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), which was comprised of 
civil servants and provided his government with in-house specialist advice across departments 
(Denham and Garnett 1999).  There are also various planning and research units in most 
government departments.  These are staffed by civil servants and enjoy a degree of independence 
and autonomy from policy makers and administrators.  There are also state research units staffed 
mainly with outside appointees, notably the Prime Minister’s policy unit.  The civil service also 
has semi-detached inspectorates that provide it with independent professional opinion on issues 
like social services or pollution.  And there are public advisory bodies, such as the Social 
Security Advisory Committee, set up by government but acting and advising independently.  
Many of these are formed on an ad hoc basis (James 1993). 
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 Why has Britain developed this sort of knowledge regime?  In particular, why are 
there relatively few research units in civil society, especially when compared to the United 
States?  First, most British research units in civil society are established under law as charities 
and, thus, are required to be educational and non-partisan, which also prevents them from 
lobbying and engaging in similar political activities.  And because the tax system is less 
accommodating for charitable giving than it is in the United States–perhaps because the British 
state has greater capacity for providing services that might otherwise be provided by charities–
there are fewer foundations to support these research units in Britain in the first place (James 
1993; Stone 1996b; 1996a, chap 3).  That said, as in other liberal market economies, corporations 
are another source of financial support for advocacy and scholarly research units (Fieschi and 
Gaffney 1998). 
 
 Second, the British civil service is more extensive, reaching up to the permanent 
bureaucratic counterpart of a minister.  It also has more internal policy-making capacity, is 
protective of its dominant position as provider of policy advice, and regards itself as an 
intellectual elite capable of handling any problem (Coleman 1991; Stone 1996a, chap. 3).  
Indeed, outside experts are rarely invited to policy discussions because civil service culture 
assumes that administrative officials are capable of transmitting any specialist material 
themselves to policy makers, and because the constitutional principle of neutrality within 
Whitehall requires civil servants to keep their distance from external policy institutes (Coleman 
1991; Stone 1996b; 2000). 
 
 Third, the opportunities for research units in civil society, especially advocacy 
research units, is limited by the fact that the centralization and insulation of political decision 
making creates only occasional windows of opportunity for them to have input–windows that are 
controlled significantly by the Prime Minister.  Thus, in 1983 Thatcher abolished Heath’s CPRS, 
but was quite open to the Adam Smith Institute.  In contrast, John Major shut out virtually all 
civil society research units.  And the relationship between Tony Blair’s government and 
advocacy research units seems to have fallen somewhere in between (Denham and Garnett 
2004).  As such, the state research units seem to be more influential on a permanent basis.  And 
those in civil society, especially the advocacy research units, sit precariously on the edge of the 
political process using publicity to affect public opinion and government thinking as best they 
can (Gaffney 1991). 
 
 Overall, then, Britain has a smaller field of research units in civil society than the 
United States because funding possibilities and points of access to the state are more limited and 
uncertain.  However, as noted earlier, advocacy research units have increased significantly since 
the 1970s.  In this regard, both Britain and the United States have competitive market places for 
ideas.  This is not surprising insofar as they both also have traditions of very acrimonious politics 
due to their winner-take-all electoral systems, which, for instance, encourage advocacy research 
units to pursue high public profiles (Thunert 2000).  But in Britain partisan ideational 
competition is mollified to a greater degree than in the United States by public funding for 
knowledge producers in civil society, fewer channels of political access, and by the state’s own 
in-house analytic capacities. 
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 It is worth mentioning that Australia is another liberal market economy with a 
relatively centralized, closed state whose knowledge regime resembles Britain’s.  There are very 
few research units in civil society in Australia and most of them emerged since the 1970s, are 
small, and operate on a financial shoe string.  The nation’s tax structure makes it very difficult to 
establish philanthropic organizations.  Business has stepped forward in some cases to provide 
funding, but only when it is assured that the business perspective will be represented.  Moreover, 
Australian political parties are strong, well disciplined, and have considerable in-house policy 
research expertise.  Hence, they are closed to external policy research and advice.  Insofar as the 
state is concerned, as in Britain, there are few conduits into government for the exchange of 
information and personnel.  And so the efforts of Australian research units in civil society are 
often trumped by those of state research units whose analytic strengths and resources are far 
superior (Stone 1998). 
 
Coordinated Market Economy/Decentralized, Open State 
 
 Germany represents a good example of a coordinated market economy with a 
relatively decentralized, open state (Katzenstein 1987).  It is a country whose economic actors 
are organized through corporatist institutions; where consensus building is held in high regard 
among these actors; and where networks of firms, suppliers, and banks typically work together to 
coordinate economic activity.  Because Germany has a federalist political system, much policy-
making authority devolves to the regional-level Länder governments, which is one reason why 
the national government lacks the same sort of extensive permanent civil service found, for 
instance, in Britain or France.  Moreover, Germany’s system of proportional representation tends 
to ensure further that politics is based on consensus building often absent in winner-take-all 
systems like the United States and Britain.  This is also facilitated by six major, well-disciplined 
political parties. 
 
 Germany’s knowledge regime has relatively few state research units providing in-
house expertise and advice.  Instead, it is dominated by over 100 scholarly research units, 
including those affiliated with universities, churches, and other non-profit organizations.  
Altogether, they constitute over half of all the research units in Germany.  The Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies and the Social Science Center Berlin (WZB) are notable 
examples (Thunert 2000, 2004).  Many are also quite large, were created by the government after 
the war, and receive about half their funding from the federal government and half from the 
Länder governments.  In fact about 75 percent of all German research units receive public 
funding.  This financial arrangement reflects Germany’s federal structure as well as the 
government’s desire to encourage competing views on economic policy and economic 
development (Thunert 2000, 2004, p. 71).  Chief among the scholarly research units are the so-
called Big Six non-partisan economic and social research institutes that were created after the 
Second World War and funded largely by the federal and Länder governments.  Policy makers 
rely on them heavily, particularly when political consensus is fragile.  They are considered to be 
the most important and influential organizations in the field.  In general, policy makers depend 
more on scholarly research units than other types (Day 2000; Gellner 1998). 
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 There are also research units closely associated with the major labor organizations, 
business associations, and political parties.  The Confederation of German Employers 
Associations, The Federation of German Industry, and the German Federation of Trade Unions 
have long had their own research units.  And each of the major political parties has its own 
research unit or political foundation, as they are often called, which are more prominent and 
better funded than their peers in most other countries in part because state funds support them too 
(Thunert 2000, 2004, pp. 77-78).  For instance, the Social Democratic Party sponsors the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  Except for their party affiliations, the political foundations resemble 
the full-service scholarly research units found in the United States, such as the Brookings 
Institution or the American Enterprise Institute.  The influence of labor or business research 
units, of course, varies depending on the party or coalition in power (Day 2000; Gellner 1998). 
 
 The existence of many well-funded scholarly and party-based research units has 
created a situation where there is little space available for the sort of independent, privately 
funded advocacy research units that are found more commonly in the United States and Britain.  
Although their numbers have been growing since 1980, they still constitute only about 30-40 
percent of all German research units.  They have relatively little political influence (Gellner 
1998; Weilemann 2000).  In fact, most German research units are proud of their scholarly 
reputations, research profiles, and the scientific soundness of their work, which they do not want 
to jeopardize by excessive partisan advocacy (Thunert 2000). 
 
 Germany’s knowledge regime reflects the strong institutional tendencies within the 
political economy for corporatist interest mediation, interlocking federalism, negotiation among 
the political parties, and for consensus building in general.  Indeed, until the late 1970s the 
development of German research units was almost entirely driven by demands of the state, 
corporatist organizations close to the state, and the political parties.  First, given the fact that 
labor and business peak associations are expected to contribute to consensus-oriented policy 
discussions, and that coalition governments are often in place, the large unions, business 
associations, and parties have recognized the benefits of having their own reliable sources of 
policy analysis and ideas and so established their own research units (Thunert 2000).   
 
 Second, the state places a higher premium on objective, scientific knowledge than 
in many other countries.  As mentioned above, the importance placed on producing high quality 
knowledge and policy advice is important to virtually all German research units, but especially 
the scholarly ones.  Everyone remembers how the Nazis and then, in East Germany, the 
communists manipulated scientific knowledge for their own political purposes.  Nobody wants to 
repeat those mistakes.  Hence, the state subsidizes many scholarly research institutes to ensure 
that their work is of the highest quality.  And beginning in the 1990s most publicly funded 
scholarly research units have been reviewed by the Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat)–a joint 
federal-Länder advisory board that evaluates these research units on standard academic criteria, 
such as that used typically to evaluate academic departments and institutions of basic research.  
Heavy reliance on state funding brings with it certain obligations that have limited the degree to 
which research units can engage in policy advising, partisanship, or ideational marketing rather 




 Third, the absence of many privately funded advocacy research units is also due to 
the fact that the permanent career civil service, which is perhaps more extensive than in other 
decentralized, open states, has its own internal policy-making capacities and is traditionally wary 
of relying too heavily on external advice–particularly that which it cannot oversee.  Although 
Germany’s federal structure provides more possible access points to policymakers than do most 
parliamentary democracies of the Westminster type, this attitude has also helped mitigate the 
proliferation of advocacy research units (Thunert 2000). 
 
 There is a tendency for more consensus-oriented knowledge production in 
Germany than in many other types of political economies–a tradition that seems to reflect the 
traditions of corporatist bargaining and coalition government.  Many well-established research 
units in civil society are members of institutionalized consulting networks.  Notably, the Big Six 
work together and seek consensus on policy analysis and economic projections.  Twice a year 
they produce the so-called Common Report–a joint analysis of the government’s short- and 
medium-term performance.  This is an analytic exercise–not one designed to offer policy 
recommendations per se.  Such recommendations are left to other research institutes, such as the 
Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik.  The intention is for all six institutes to concur on a joint 
conclusion, although recently this has not always happened (Atkins 2006; Benoit 2006; Thunert 
2004).   
 
 Of course, German research units compete intensely for funding, prestige, and the 
attention of policy makers as they do elsewhere.  They often represent different political or 
ideological positions and, as a result, do not always agree on things, as illustrated by the recent 
dissent among the Big Six.  But because they tend to adopt a very scholarly approach where 
standards of research are high, and because they understand the consensus-oriented nature of 
German policy making, their policy recommendations are likely to be tempered to a degree often 
absent in liberal market economies like the United States and even Britain.  Indeed, policy 
makers typically solicit input from a mixture of advisors from different backgrounds and a 
variety of party and scholarly research units, including those affiliated with unions and business 
(Thunert 2000).  Furthermore, another reason why the major research units are likely to moderate 
their tone is because most of their funding comes from the public sector, which is typically run 
by coalition governments (Weilemann 2000, p. 173).  
 
  Since the Second World War the Netherlands has resembled Germany in the sense 
that it is a political economy based in large part on corporatist negotiation and coalition 
governments that strive for consensus building.  It also lacks the sort of extensive civil service 
seen, for instance, in centralized, closed states like Britain and France that have considerable in-
house policy research and analytic capacities.  All of this spills over into the Dutch knowledge 
regime. 
 
 Research units play an important role in policy making in part because, beginning 
in the 1960s, the state apparatus began growing rapidly, policy making could no longer be run 
from a single political center, and so the government moved to develop external social science 
expertise for policy making.  First, American-style advocacy research units are rare.  Second, 
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each of the twelve political parties developed an adjunct party research unit (Day 2000).  Third, 
and more important, there is a group of publically funded scholarly research units, which provide 
independent, external advice to the government. 
 
 An important example is the Social Economic Council, which is composed of 
representatives from labor unions, employer organizations, and crown appointees.  Another is the 
Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, which is considered the country’s 
research unit par excellence and is composed of 11 members appointed by the queen on 
recommendation of the prime minister.  It consists typically of economists, sociologists, legal 
scholars, international relations specialists, and natural scientists–most of whom are university 
professors–but also occasionally people from large corporations.  Care is taken to ensure that it is 
not politically partisan or ideologically biased.  It focuses on socioeconomic policy and 
government organizations, and it has about 40 scientific and administrative staff.  It provides 
policy advice on many subjects; has independence vis-a-vis the government in terms of setting 
its agenda and doing its work; publishes reports free of government interference; and seems to 
have influence on the policy-making process.  Yet it is linked to the government in terms of its 
budget and appointment process. 
 
 The point is that the Netherlands’ coalition-based, parliamentary, multi-party 
system, coupled with a state lacking an extensive technocracy and in-house analytic capacities, 
created space for truly independent, non-partisan, scholarly research units.  And the country’s 
proclivity for corporatist negotiation and political coalition building is reflected in the 
organization of its knowledge regime (Baehr 1986; Day 2000; Mentzel 1999).  
 
Coordinated Market Economy/Centralized, Closed State 
 
 France is an example of a coordinated market economy with a centralized, closed 
state.  There is much less corporatism in France than in Germany, but since the Second World 
War the state engaged in much indicative planning based on formal consultations among labor, 
business, the Ministry of Finance, and other relevant ministries, and often facilitated by the 
Commissariat du Plan.  So economic governance in France is rather statist relative to the other 
countries discussed here.  Furthermore, France has a long history of state-owned enterprise in 
critical infrastructure sectors.  However, the French state’s capacity to influence the economy is 
also considerable because it is very centralized.  Policy-making authority is vested largely in the 
national government; the executive branch tends to hold sway over the legislature; and policy-
making is closed and insulated formally from many outside pressure groups.  Moreover, policy-
making tends to be technocratic due to the fact that the state has an extensive, permanent, and 
well-trained civil service.  Finally, there are several well-disciplined political parties and an 
electoral system of proportional representation, which often results in coalition governments. 
 
 Much of France’s policy research and analysis is conducted by state research units.  
In addition to the Commissariat du Plan, which conducts much research and analysis itself, most 
ministries have similar analytic capacities (Desmoulins 2000).  Furthermore, each ministry has 
its own cabinet, an ad hoc group of experts arranged around a minister offering him analysis and 
policy advice.  The cabinets complement and often rival the traditional ministerial bureaucracy 
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(Fieschi and Gaffney 2004).  By law each minister has the right to appoint a number of advisors 
to her cabinet.  Most of them are civil servants coming from the École Normale d’Administration 
(ENA), where they are trained to become loyal, non-partisan, technocratic servants of the state 
regardless of the particular government in power.  The cabinets also include outsiders, notably 
expert intellectuals from the leading universities.  The cabinets have become key lynch pins 
connecting political ideas and their application.  They have great influence upon agenda setting 
and policy elaboration.  They were instrumental, for instance, in helping the Mitterrand 
government develop new policies after it abandoned its pre-1981 socialist agenda (Desmouolins 
2000, p. 154; Fieschi and Gaffney 1998; Gaffney 1991). 
 
 France’s knowledge regime also includes an elaborate network of scholarly 
research units, many of which belong to one of two principal umbrella bodies: the Center 
National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the Institut National de Statistiques et 
d’Études Economiques (INSEE).  CNRS runs about 1,500 research laboratories and research 
centers around the country, but only a small number of these do policy research (Desmoulins 
2000, p. 144).  INSEE generates social, economic, and political data and analysis and the Institut 
National d’Études Demographique (INED) provides demographic data and analysis.  Their 
researchers and managers are drawn mostly from the Grandes Écoles–the elite national 
universities.  Most of the scholarly research units under these umbrella organizations are much 
smaller in terms of staff and budget than those in the countries discussed earlier.  None are 
comparable in terms of multidisciplinary competence to the most prestigious scholarly research 
units in the United States, like Brookings.  Most are linked to a particular state administrative 
organization, receive financing from either it or another state agency, hire civil servants on a 
part-time basis, and are affiliated with academic institutions.  Most also have state 
representatives sitting on their boards of directors.  Many are reviewed annually by the Conseil 
d’Etat (state council) to ensure that they are performing a public service function (Day 2000; 
Desmoulins 2000; Fieschi and Gaffney 2004). 
 
 The political parties have research units, but these are relatively insignificant.  That 
said, so-called political clubs emerge occasionally that represent a kind of distant cousin to 
traditional party research units, but more closely resemble advocacy research units.  Political 
clubs are groups of experts, scholars, and other political advisors.  They often coalesce around a 
particular political figure, usually someone who is out of power but seeking high political office.  
For instance, Club 89 formed around Jacques Chirac, and Démocratie 2000 and Clysthène 
formed around Jacques Delors.  Such clubs often arise when the party to whom their political 
figure is affiliated is viewed as performing badly, so the relationship between the clubs and 
parties is often contentious.  When the government’s Algerian policies were questioned during 
the 1950s and 1960s dozens of political clubs were created that fostered the new left movement 
in France.  Often political clubs dissolve as soon as the crisis that produced them has passed.  As 
a result, political clubs are a kind of transitory hybrid.  They resemble party research units 
insofar as they are loosely affiliated with a party, or at least with an individual or movement that 
is affiliated with a party.  But they are also like advocacy research units to the extent that they are 
identified mostly through their ideological or political commitments, seek to impact public 
debate, and only occasionally do a bit of research.  They often act more like ideological lobbies 
than scholarly research units (Desmoulins 2000, p. 154; Fieschi and Gaffney 2004).   
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 There are some full-fledged advocacy research units.  Notably, the French new 
right established two very well known research units: the Groupement de Recherche et d’Étude 
sur la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE), founded in 1968, and the Club de l’Horloge, founded 
in 1974.  Both sought to influence politics through research and debate and carve out a political 
discursive space comparable to what the new left had done (Fieschi and Gaffney 2004).  
Although advocacy research units have been comparatively unimportant in France, they have 
been on the rise since the mid-1990s.  Given the intricacies of French electoral politics, this has 
been a time during which a left-wing government and prime minister has cohabited with a 
Gaullist president.  Both president and prime minister have sought to broaden their powers vis-a-
vis each other and the balance of power between the two heads of the executive has been quite 
unstable.  In this intensely competitive political environment, advocacy research units have been 
relied upon more than usual as sources of information, advice, and policy proposals.  
Nevertheless, advocacy research units in France are neither large nor long-lived.  And they tend 
not to be affiliated with a particular political party but rather gather together on a temporary basis 
around single issues (Desmoulins 2000, pp. 149-50). 
 
 France’s political-economic institutions are largely responsible for the state-
centered organization of its knowledge regime.  First, the French civil service culture does not 
provide many opportunities for research units in civil society to participate in policy making.  
Indeed, most policy makers turn only rarely to these research units for expertise and advice 
because they already have their own in-house sources of experts in various disciplines within the 
civil service (Desmoulins 2000, p. 149). 
 
 Second, given the highly centralized, closed nature of the state, parliament is not a 
regular client for independent public policy expertise.  This is much different from the situation 
in the United States where dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees often seek 
outside policy expertise and, therefore, provide many channels of access for research units to 
engage policy makers.  So, with few exceptions, party research units, including political clubs, 
and traditional advocacy research units tend to be of little use to French policy makers.  They 
may affect public debate, but it is not clear that they affect policy making per se (Desmoulins 
2000; Fieschi and Gaffney 1998).   
 
 Third, the reluctance to turn to research units in civil society in France also stems 
from a long-standing distrust of the market in French politics–a distrust that has meant that the 
French state is seen as a protector of the republic (Desmoulins 2000, p. 145-46).  Similarly, 
political parties have been historically mistrusted of excessive partisanship, political 
divisiveness, and of being disruptive to the republic, which further hobbles the capacity of party 
research units to exercise much influence (Fieschi and Gaffney 2004). 
 
 Fourth, the French state plays an extensive role in protecting the welfare of its 
citizens so there is no well-developed philanthropic sector.  The absence of private philanthropy 
as well as a lack of much interest among corporations for providing financial support also 
contributes to the paucity of many research units in civil society (Desmoulins 2000; Fieschi and 
Gaffney 2004).  This also contributes to the generally small scale of most of these research units.  
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And it is one reason why these organizations often have to scramble to make ends meet 
financially by pursuing not only state subsidies, but also contracts from both public and private 
actors (Desmoulins 2000). 
 
 We have shown that France’s knowledge regime is dominated by state research 
units as well as scholarly research units closely tied to the state, such as those associated with 
CNRS.  But it is also dominated by a class of people with very similar intellectual and social 
backgrounds–many of whom are drawn from the prestigious ENA and Institut des Études 
Politiques.  Hence, the French knowledge regime is not only rather statist and technocratic in 
comparison to other countries, but also more elitist.  And this intellectual elite, which is heavily 
concentrated in Paris, provides much informal advice to policy makers.  Indeed, France has a 
long tradition whereby intellectuals influenced policy makers through personal connections so it 
is only as a last resort that these experts participate in research units to influence policy 
(Desmoulins 2000, p. 153). 
 
 Some features of the French knowledge regime can be found in other countries 
with coordinated market economies and centralized, closed states.  For instance, post-Franco 
Spain inherited a centralized state bureaucracy, a weakly organized civil society, a tendency for 
much state coordination of the economy, and a lingering distrust by the state of civil society 
organizations.  Moreover, the legal framework since Franco’s demise in 1975 has been slow to 
change so it has not provided extensive fiscal incentives for the formation of non-profit 
organizations.  And private sector organizations have been more concerned with maintaining 
their special prerogatives than in promoting their broader policy interests.  Hence, Spanish 
research units are rare, numbering only about 100.  Of these, the largest minority are state 
research units.  About 40 percent are also scholarly research units.  They rely heavily on public 
financing and tend not to aggressively market their findings or develop a particular political 
profile, preferring instead to cultivate an image of objectivity and neutrality (Freres et al. 2000). 
 
 Similarly, Japanese policy-making has been conducted historically behind closed 
doors in a centralized, closed state, albeit in consultation with leaders of large corporations and 
trade associations.  It has also been carried out by governments dominated by one party 
throughout most of the post-Second World War era.  Indeed, policy making is largely controlled 
by government ministries in a technocratic fashion similar to that in France.  Neither the law in 
general nor the tax code in particular allow for an independent, non-governmental, non-profit 
sector.  Furthermore, Japanese intellectuals and the media engage in much self-censorship when 
commenting on government policies.  As a result, research units in civil society are rare.  There 
are a few public non-profit research organizations, which in practice are simply extensions of the 
ministries and, therefore, resemble state research units.  Foremost among them is the National 
Institute for Research Advancement, which was established in 1974 and that provides policy 
makers with relevant and unbiased research information.  There are also a few for-profit 
scholarly research units, such as the Mitsubishi Research Institute, financed by industry or banks.  
But the bulk of policy research is conducted by state research units (Ueno 1998). 
 
Toward An Ideal-Typical Account of Knowledge Regimes 
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 Based on the country descriptions presented above, we now draw some tentative 
conclusions about the nature of knowledge regimes in different types of political economies.  
The discussion is summarized in Table 1, which presents four ideal-type knowledge regimes 
corresponding to the four types of political economies we have just discussed.  Our intent here is 
to develop some initial propositions to guide future research. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 We suspect that in liberal market economies with decentralized, open states 
knowledge regimes will be characterized by many privately funded scholarly and advocacy 
research units, some state research units, and no party research units to speak of.  This market-
oriented knowledge regime represents an intensely competitive market place of ideas.  It is 
marked by partisan and adversarial contests among knowledge producers trying to influence both 
public opinion and policy makers.  Of the four types of knowledge regimes, this one is probably 
the most competitive and the most heavily reliant on private financing, both corporate and 
philanthropic, although there are certainly plenty of government contacts and grants.  The state 
research units also compete against one another and against research units in civil society for the 
attention of policy makers. 
 
 In contrast, we hypothesize that knowledge regimes in liberal market economies 
with centralized, closed states will have fewer scholarly and advocacy research units.  These will 
be supported by a mixture of public and private funds.  It will also have a much more substantial 
set of state research units.  There will be few significant party research units.  So, compared to 
the liberal market economies with decentralized, open states, the mixture of types of research 
units will be a bit more balanced.  And like its decentralized, open state counterpart, this 
knowledge regime will be a partisan, adversarial, and competitive market place for ideas.  
However, the importance of the competitive market place for ideas will be tempered by the 
significant role that state research units play, particularly within the well-established civil 
service.  As a result, we call this type the politically-tempered knowledge regime. 
 
 Insofar as coordinated market economies are concerned, we suggest that those with 
decentralized, open states will have a moderately sized set of research units in civil society, 
dominated primarily by scholarly research units rather than advocacy research units.  These 
organizations will be heavily dependent on public funding.  There will also be an important array 
of party research units and a reasonable number of state research units.  The comparative absence 
of advocacy research units is indicative of the fact that this knowledge regime is less oriented to 
competitive, partisan, and adversarial competition, and more oriented toward the production of 
knowledge for a consensus-oriented policy process.  This consensus-oriented knowledge regime 
is consistent with the surrounding corporatist institutions and system of proportional 
representation in electoral politics, which puts a premium on consensus building and moderation 
in policy making.  Whereas ideational competition is tempered by the state in liberal market 
economies with centralized, closed states, ideational competition is tempered in coordinated 
market economies with decentralized, open states by a generally accepted and institutionally 
supported concern with compromise. 
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 Finally, we come to the statist-technocratic knowledge regimes found in 
coordinated market economies with centralized, closed states.  We anticipate that these will have 
few advocacy or party research units.  There will be more publicly funded scholarly research 
units and state research units of various sorts.  Economic coordination depends far more on the 
state in this type of political economy than in the rest, which is why the production of policy-
relevant knowledge will also be left largely to the state.  Again, the absence of advocacy research 
units signals that knowledge production in these countries is relatively non-partisan.  But in 
contrast to coordinated market economies with decentralized, open states, where knowledge 
regimes exhibit tendencies toward ideational consensus building, coordinated market economies 
with centralized, closed states will likely have knowledge regimes that are highly technocratic in 





 This paper represents an attempt to map the topography of knowledge regimes in 
different types of political economies.  Our intent has been to specify the various organizational 
actors and institutional mechanisms by which policy-relevant ideas are generated in different 
political-economic types.  Attention to these sorts of actors and mechanisms has been lacking in 
much of the literature on how ideas affect the policy-making process.  As such, the paper 
represents an improvement on the general literature on ideas and policy making reviewed earlier. 
 
 The paper also reunites two literatures in comparative political economy–the work 
on policy-making and production regimes–to suggest how different institutional forms of 
political economies affect how knowledge regimes are organized and operate.  In this regard, it 
begins to rectify the curious separation in the work of some comparative political economists 
where, on the one hand, they discuss the importance of ideas and, on the other hand, they 
examine how policy-making and production regimes operate, but without much attention to the 
role of ideas and knowledge regimes. 
 
 We recognize the limitations of typologies, particularly those based on simple 
dichotomous distinctions.  Notably, the literature on production regimes, which provided us with 
the concepts of liberal and coordinated market economies, has been criticized for being overly 
simplistic and neglecting the proliferation of hybrid forms (Campbell and Pedersen 2007; Crouch 
2005).  As a result, there may be important differences in production, policy-making, and, 
therefore, knowledge regimes among countries that fall into any of the four political economic 
types we have discussed.  Hybrid forms are likely. 
 
 This paper advances the literature on think tanks upon which we have relied 
heavily.  First, much of this literature only examines the relationship between research units and 
policy-making regimes, not production regimes.  Yet we have shown that both policy and 
production regimes shape knowledge regimes. 
 
 Second, the think tank literature takes a rather narrow view of what policy-relevant 
knowledge producing organizations are.  It focuses primarily on advocacy and scholarly research 
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units.  Much less attention is paid to either state research units or research units associated with 
political parties.  This may be because the bulk of the literature focuses on the United States and 
Britain, two liberal market economies where advocacy and scholarly research units are 
comparatively prominent.  By expanding the range of countries under observation to include 
coordinated market economies, we have found that other types of research units are particularly 
important in certain types of political economies. 
 
 Third, much of the literature on think tanks dwells on the organization of research 
units (e.g., the number of research units operating, their funding sources, their staffing levels, 
etc.).  Much less attention is paid to the process by which knowledge is produced and 
disseminated to policy makers.  We have suggested that this process may vary tremendously, 
ranging from highly competitive, adversarial, and politically partisan, to comparatively 
consensual and non-partisan, to rather technocratic.  The process depends on the organization of 
the knowledge regime, which depends in turn on the organization of the production and policy-
making regimes with which it is associated.  Much more needs to be learned about these 
processes–particularly because they may have significant effects on the content of that 
knowledge and the impact it has on policy makers.   
 
 We have said very little about content and impact.  But one thing is striking.  Since 
the late 1970s, among the countries discussed here the most radical neoliberal policy advice 
emerged in two liberal market economies, the United States and Britain, where privately funded 
advocacy research units enjoyed influential positions in the knowledge regime, and knowledge 
production and dissemination was a comparatively contested and competitive process with fairly 
clear winners and losers.  Other types of knowledge regimes with different processes did not 
produce such radical advice.  This suggests that different processes may affect the content of the 
knowledge produced.  Our hunch is that coordinated market economies tend to produce policy 
knowledge that favors comparatively incremental policy reform whereas liberal market 
economies tend to produce policy knowledge that favors more radical policy reform.  Why?  
Because knowledge regimes in coordinated market economies are more consensus or 
technocratically oriented and, therefore, cautious while in liberal market economies they are 
more partisan, adversarial, and acrimonious, and, therefore, prone to more extreme policy 
recommendations.  This, of course, also raises the issue of what impact knowledge regimes 
actually have, or not, on policy makers–a methodologically vexing question that scholars have 
only begun to address (e.g., Abelson 2002). 
 
 Two final thoughts are in order.  We recognize that adding an historical dimension 
to our analysis would probably confound our knowledge regime typology to a degree insofar as 
real-world knowledge regimes often evolve dynamically in ways that make it difficult to fit them 
neatly into any one ideal type.  For example, the rise of advocacy research units was an 
important shift in many of our countries and may signal a shift toward more competitively 
oriented knowledge regimes.   
 
 We also recognize that specifying particular policy areas might confound our 
fitting of cases to political-economic typologies.  For instance, if we examined the knowledge 
regime associated specifically with U.S. defense policy, it might be difficult to fit this case into 
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the liberal market economy/decentralized, open state category because defense policy-making is 
considerably less public and more insulated within the Department of Defense and a few 
congressional committees.  And historically defense policy makers have relied heavily on only a 
few scholarly research units operating on government contracts like the RAND Corporation.  But 
if we looked at the knowledge regime associated with economic or trade policy, then the fit 
might be better.  The point is that the more closely one specifies the policy area, the more likely 
it is that there will be variation within countries in terms of how their political economies and, 
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Table 1.  Typology of Knowledge Regimes 
 
 Liberal Market Economy Coordinated Market Economy 
Decentralized, 
Open State 
Market-Oriented Knowledge Regime 
 
Large, privately funded research unit sector 
in civil society 
 
Scholarly and advocacy research units 
dominate 
 
Highly adversarial, partisan, and 
competitive  knowledge production process 
 
Consensus-Oriented Knowledge Regime 
 
Moderate, publicly funded research unit sector in 
civil society 
 
Scholarly, party, and state  research units evenly 
balanced 
 
Consensus-oriented, relatively non-partisan 
knowledge production process 
Centralized, 
Closed State 
Politically-Tempered Knowledge Regime 
 
Small, publicly & privately funded research 
unit sector in civil society 
 
Scholarly, advocacy, and state research units 
evenly balanced 
 
Moderately adversarial, partisan, and 
competitive knowledge production process 
 
Statist-Technocratic Knowledge Regime 
 
Large, publicly funded research unit sector in 
civil society 
 
Scholarly and state research units dominate 
 
 
Technocratic, non-partisan knowledge 
production process 
 
 
